

# **Fear and Anger: How does the emotionalisation of news reports affect perceptions of terrorism risk?**

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## **Abstract**

In the wake of recent terrorist attacks, public concern for British national security has manifested in divisive policy and rhetoric. Many argue that news media outlets have a role in propagating such concerns. This paper analysed the ways in which readers respond to emotive language in media reports and how it may change their perceived risk of terrorism. Through an online survey, the experiment used framings of either 'fear' or 'anger' to induce a priming effect. Self-reported emotional responses and perceptions of future terrorism risk were then measured to determine the effect of each article. Thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews was undertaken to build upon the survey. Firstly, a reverse priming effect existed within our sample (n = 304) as, on average, those primed with languages of anger expressed a lower level of anger. This suggests that the sample, consisting predominantly of students, were receptive to emotionalised journalism, but subsequently offset and countered its effect. Secondly, while emotions of sadness and shock were more associated with concern for personal safety, anger was more related to national security concerns. The implications for further studies include the importance of breaking from the past American-9/11 focus, the possibility of reverse priming and the utilisation of qualitative data to further the insights made.

**Key words:** Terrorism, Media, Fear, Anger, Priming

## 1. Introduction

Given recent terrorist attacks, terrorism and security have been significant issues in the UK 2017 General Election (e.g. BBC News, 2017a). However, much less attention in the public and policy worlds has been given to the role the media in relation to terrorism. Many in the academic world position terrorism and the media as having a 'symbiotic' relationship (Wilkinson, 1997; Shoshani and Slone, 2012). The media's role is particularly significant given its use of framings that influence both the public's emotions and their perceptions of future terror risk (Braithwaite, 2013). This terrorism-media relationship has been explored from a variety of academic perspectives, including criminology (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Ahmed, 2015), game theory (Rohner and Frey, 2007; Pfeiffer, 2012), and psychology (Smelser, 2009; Braithwaite, 2013). However, much of the past literature is limited to 9/11 and the US (Nellis and Savage, 2012). Therefore, we extend the current research to the UK by considering the *role of the media, through its use of emotional frames (of anger and fear), in influencing individuals' emotions and risk perceptions surrounding terrorist attacks*. We also believe that past research has failed to fully utilise qualitative methods to best understand the emotions and risk perceptions surrounding terrorism that arise through the media. This paper proceeds in the following manner, Section 2 sets the scene of our research in relation to the past literature whilst Section 3 details the how and why of our methodological approach. Section 4 presents and discusses our findings. Section 5 concludes, with implications for theory and further research discussed.

## 2. Literature Review

Whilst it is not possible to fully discuss the contemporary debates surrounding our key concepts, it is necessary to briefly define terrorism, given the particular contention over this (Greene, 2017). Due to our research being situated in the UK, the UK's legal definition appears most applicable, with terrorism defined as the "use or threat of action...designed to influence the government or intimidate the public...for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause" (UK Terrorism Act 2000).

Terrorist attacks and the media are argued to have a naturally 'symbiotic' relationship, to the extent they have merged into 'terroredia' (Eid, 2014; Iqbal, 2015). The media is argued to supply the 'oxygen of publicity' for terrorists, providing a platform to progress their cause (Powell, 2011; Beckett, 2016). Conversely, the media utilises the emotionally-strong stories of terrorist attacks to increase their audience size and engagement (Wilkinson, 1997). For both, the public is both the audience and target (Braithwaite, 2013). Such a relationship is considered to be cyclical, with violence, media attention and subsequent public fear exacerbating one another (Eid, 2014). Furthermore, such relationship can be inherently difficult to break, given that the public is reliant on the media for information due to the rarity of terrorist events (Nellis and Savage, 2012).

This public dependence on the media has important ramifications through the use of framings, causing the media to influence *how* the public think and feel on an issue (Rill and Davies, 2008). Although all media utilises frames (Powell, 2011), they can vary in nature, from overt sensationalism to more subtle changes in tone, wording and emphasis (Ecker *et al.*, 2014). However, their effect on emotions or perceptions should not be considered unconditional, with each reader having their own frame through which they consider information (Entman, 1993). For the public, terrorist acts are particularly bound with emotions of fear (that it will happen again) and anger (at the loss of life/government incapability) (Wilkinson, 1997). Such emotions are often

utilised by the media, particularly for the Manchester Arena attack (Beckett, 2017), and can exacerbate the perceived risk of a future attack (Braithwaite, 2013). This effect on risk perceptions is particularly significant in terrorist attack framings due to already existing heightened-emotions and the involuntary nature of the risk (Kapuściński and Richards, 2016).

Empirical analysis into the effect of media framings of 'fear' and 'anger' on terror risk perceptions has seen steadily increasing interest, particularly post-9/11 (Rich, 2013). In America, the emotions of anger and fear in respondents appears to be distinct, with angry individuals not undertaking precautionary action in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (Skitka *et al.*, 2006). Additionally, 'fear' and 'anger' frames in American media rarely occur together (Soroka *et al.*, 2015). Emotions of anger are shown to increase individuals' propensity for risk-taking behaviour and more optimistic risk assessments, possibly due to the increased certainty associated with anger (Skitka *et al.*, 2006; Sirin and Geva, 2013). This contrasts with fear, where individuals are more favourable for risk-avoidance and more pessimistic risk assessments (Sirin and Geva, 2013; Carlson and Davey, 2014). Emotions of fear appear to particularly increase the perceived risk to personal safety, rather than for others (Braithwaite, 2013). However, individuals can implicitly or explicitly be unreceptive to framings due to preconceptions and media scepticism (Sensales *et al.*, 2014).

This research builds on this literature to provide originality and further insights. Firstly, we move beyond the American and 9/11-centric literature (Nellis and Savage, 2012) to consider the effects in the UK. This bias to the American media and audience is problematic as the British equivalents are considered more rational and less emotional (Quates, 2006), hence framings and their effects may be more subtle. Secondly, we consider the effect of framing on a highly recent terrorist attack (the Manchester Arena attack) whereby individuals are experiencing salient emotions, rather than recalling them from a later date, possibly problematic given recall bias

(MacKerron, 2012). Lastly, we utilise qualitative methods to better understand the role of fear and anger in terrorism risk perceptions, an approach unfortunately underutilised.

### **3. Methodology**

#### ***3.1 Experimental design***

To test the effect of media framing, an experiment was constructed to isolate its impact. This was embedded in an online survey to expedite sampling. During the experiment, participants were shown extracts from articles about the Manchester Arena attack. These extracts were categorised into three framing categories – fear, anger and neutrality<sup>1</sup> - as informed by our preliminary discourse analysis, the first two as treatment groups, and the last one as a control group. Participants were then randomly assigned one of the frames to ensure that any differences between and within the groups were not systematic. Thus, comparisons between treatment and control groups represented the priming effect of emotionalised journalism.

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 7.1 for the extracts.

**Fig. 1. Survey Design Flow Diagram**




Figure 1 details the progression of the survey. Demographic questions were included because these characteristics could be a source of confounding variation and, therefore, should be controlled for in regression analysis. Under-18 participants were screened out, and the sample also

separated UK and non-UK residents. Emotional responses, following priming, were self-reported on a continuous sliding scale from 'not at all' to 'extremely' so that mid-point/extreme response biases were mitigated. These were asked in a randomized order to ensure that order effects would be counterbalanced (Couper *et al.*, 2001). Similarly, questions pertaining to concern for personal, family safety and national security were presented in a randomised order.

Concern for economic stability (providing a baseline for risk perception), media usage (an indicator of predetermined views) and media industry affiliation (a source of stakeholder bias), were included to be controlled for. Additionally, a trap question was added to filter for response fatigue and survey speeding.

Self-reported emotions and risk perception questions were asked immediately after the priming, when the articles were fresh in respondents' minds. Conversely, questions about media exposure and affiliation were posed later on to avoid influence from the priming articles.


Finally, open-ended opinion questions were included to serve as a base for interviews. Analysis of these responses yielded several main themes that were used in interview design.



### 3.2 Preliminary results and model specification

From the literature, we hypothesised that exposure to emotive framings would be significantly and positively correlated with self-reports of the associated emotions. The priming effect from the media framing was captured by the instrumental variable (IV) model's first stage. Any latent endogeneity problems were resolved through IV regression, which isolated the second stage. Affect heuristics were of particular interest here, being an aspect of human thinking where feelings serve as cues to guide quick and efficient judgements. The IV model specification is shown in Figure 2.

*Fig. 2. Initial IV specification*




However, preliminary studies yielded compelling evidence for heterogeneous priming effects. Reverse priming effects were observed and it was clear that participants' self-reported emotions were not related to media framings in a predictable or significant way.

As the weakness of the first stage undermined the IV relevance condition, this specification was replaced with separate OLS models (Fig. 3). Here, priming effects were computed by OLS

regression. However, with respect to the second stage, emotions were endogenously determined. Reverse causality (i.e. perceived risk driving emotions) and confounders (e.g. predetermined views) limited causal interpretations of these associations. Therefore, analysis of this looked to the different correlations between specific emotions and subjects of concerns, as well as other possible factors that drive them.

*Fig. 3. Separate OLS specifications*



### **3.3 Participants**

A sample of 304 participants, made up of 142 (46.7%) males and 160 (52.6%) females, was used in the experiment. The largest age category was '18-24', with 219 participants (72%).


This sample was not representative of the UK population, an expected effect given the distribution of the survey online and the use of snowball sampling (Dutton *et al.*, 2013). This was visible in the final sample, as 200 (65.8%) respondents were university students and 213 (70.1%) were UK residents. The framing articles were evenly distributed with 103, 106, 95 participants respectively assigned the neutral, anger and fear articles. 169 (55.6%) individuals were surveyed after the London Bridge Attack, which occurred whilst we were collecting data.

### ***3.4 Semi-structured interview design***

We utilised semi-structured interviews to better understand individuals' emotions and risk perceptions surrounding terrorism (Gibson and Brown, 2009). The structure of interviews is shown in Figure 4. We thematically analysed the transcripts to interpret patterns of meaning in interviews (Clarke and Braun, 2017).

Thematic analysis can move between two epistemological extremes - interpretivism and positivism. For instance, extrapolation is considered a limitation in a positivist approach, while it is considered beneficial in an interpretivist one (Guest *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, thematic analysis complemented the use of experimental methods, which are aligned more closely with positivist approaches. Fully integrated mixed methods allows for further insights, an approach under-utilised in the existing literature (Mason, 2006).

*Fig. 4. Interview design diagram*



## 4. Analysis and Key Findings

### 4.1 Heterogeneous priming effects

#### 4.1.1 Reverse priming effect from 'anger' framing

*Fig. 5. One-Way ANOVA, self-reported anger by the three framing groups*

Comparing self-reported Anger by three framing groups			
	d.f.	F	obs. sig.
Between Groups	2	2.507	0.083
Within Groups	301		
Total	303		

*Fig. 6. Least Squared Difference Test, self-reported anger between the three framing groups*

Comparing self-reported Anger by three framing groups ('Anger', 'Fear', 'Neutral')			
	Mean Difference	Std. Error	obs. sig.
'Anger' against 'Neutral'	-.86236*	0.462	0.063
'Anger' against 'Fear'	-.93450**	0.471	0.048
'Fear' against 'Neutral'	0.07214	0.475	0.879
*significance at 10% level			
**significance at 5% level			

Interestingly, a reverse priming effect was observed within the group exposed to the 'anger' framing. The ANOVA decomposition in Fig. 5 indicates that the difference in self-reported anger between these framing groups was significant at an 8.3% significance level, justifying analysis of between group variation. Specifically, Fig. 6 shows that the mean self-reported anger in the 'anger' framing group was 0.862 less than that within the 'neutral' framing group and 0.934 less than that within the 'fear' framing group, at significance levels of 6.3% and 4.8%, respectively.

This suggests that, within our experiment, readers responded to languages of anger in media reports by correcting, and even countering, its intended effect. Indeed, this theme was salient in interviews.

A 22-year old LSE student expressed mixed feelings in regards to the way in which the media has reported recent UK terrorist attacks. On the one hand, he expressed how the 'anger' priming extracts evoked strong feelings of anger. On the other hand, he stated how he was "very much aware" of the way in which news reports were overly dramatic and simplified. In other words, he was able to rationalize his emotional response to mitigate its effect of risk perception. This effect, to some extent, can be expected to arise with policymakers, due to their similarly high education standards and media engagement (Powell, 2011).

Furthermore, there was evidence to suggest that readers associated emotive discourse with a lack of legitimacy, leading them to disengage from it. For example, an interviewee explained how it was "poisonous when the public is wrongly fed", demonstrating the dismissal of sensationalist news as 'wrong' news. Another put forward how he made sure to "look across the spectrum... from the main standard like the BBC to the Daily Mail" because it is "so difficult to find unbiased media".

This recognition of framing by individuals suggests how self-awareness, rationalization and scepticism can lead to a reverse priming effect whereby emotions are not heightened.

#### 4.1.2 Insignificant priming effects of 'fear' framing

Fig. 7. Least Squared Difference Test, self-reported fear between the three framing groups

Comparing self-reported Fear by three framing groups ('Anger', 'Fear', 'Neutral')			
	Mean Difference	Std. Error	obs. sig.
'Anger' against 'Neutral'	0.23096	0.391	0.555
'Anger' against 'Fear'	0.05162	0.399	0.897
'Fear' against 'Neutral'	0.17934	0.402	0.656
*significance at 10% level			
**significance at 5% level			

A weak priming effect was observed within the group exposed to the 'fear' framing. This is indicated by Fig. 7, which shows the insignificance of mean differences of self-reported fear between framing groups.

Though insignificant effects are insufficient to conclude resistance to priming within a hypothesis testing framework, these results are notably consistent with themes highlighted in interviews.

Firstly, before being shown the framing extracts, most interviewees had alluded to behaviours that demonstrated a fear of future terror attacks. Avoiding overly crowded areas like Oxford Street and taking the tube less frequently were mentioned. This may indicate that emotions of fear are more significantly determined by factors exogenous to priming effects, such as pre-existing emotions and the frequency of exposure to media reports.

Indeed, a male student explained how receiving constant notifications on his phone from newspapers like the Guardian and the BBC, circulated via social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram was more influential in determining his emotions than the content *per se*. This suggests that the more relevant role of media in propagating public concern pertains to its volume, rather than specific discourses used. Certainly, the ascendancy of social media in the

context of 'terroredia' (Eid, 2014) motivates a contemporary revision of this phenomenon that focuses on exposure, rather than content.

Furthermore, some interviewees were also eager to express that they did not feel fear. For example, a 26 year old male said "I am not scared, I do not feel anything in particular besides the fact that I do not agree with what is happening". In this sense, a resistance to priming effects may be motivated by an unwillingness to align with the terrorists' intentions of spreading fear.

As such, exogenous determinants, disengagement with language in a highly-exposed media age and resistance to terrorist intentions may explain the insignificance of the 'fear' priming effect.

#### ***4.1.3 Limited external validity of priming effect estimates***

The results drawn from this study suggest an ineffectiveness of media framings in invoking fear and anger. While this result is very interesting, as a contradiction to the existing literature, sampling biases limit the external validity of these results. Specifically, the overrepresentation of students meant that these effects are more relevant to educated, internet users. Such groups are likely to be more informed and sceptical towards the media, with the effects described above potentially of limited applicability to others

Within our sample, a large number stated that media framings were more influential among the general public, and deliberately excluded themselves from this 'outsider' group. Indeed, one interviewee explained how "the media definitely affects people's emotions, they make their living that way...but not me." This corroborates with answers to open-ended survey questions. For instance, one student stated that although "I am trying to abstain from the mass-media, except for several professional outlets, the problem is not the terrorism portrayal *per se*, but the overall tendency for shocking, emotion-inducing and unprofessional news". Thus, interviewees in our



sample seemed to be particularly critical and aware of the potential effects of the media on their perceptions of terrorism risk.

#### ***4.2 Associations between subjects of concern and self-reported emotions***

To identify a useful subset of predictor variables, stepwise regression was used. With many predictor variables, this systematical process was helpful for identifying the significant regressors. However, given the potential for spurious correlation and endogeneity, interview analysis was used to unpack these associations.

##### ***4.2.1 Concern for national security***

***Fig. 8. Regressors of significance from stepwise regression on concern that there would be a future attack on UK soil***

Stepwise regression of 'concern of another attack'			
	coefficient	Std. Error	obs. sig.
(constant)	2.504	0.420	0.000
Self reported Fear	0.315***	0.053	0.000
Self reported Anger	0.260***	0.044	0.000
Self reported Sadness	0.143***	0.050	0.004
Economic concern	0.096**	0.045	0.034
***significance at 1% level			
**significance at 5% level			

*Fig. 9. Regressors of significance from stepwise regression on concern for national security*


Stepwise regression of 'concern of national security'			
	coefficient	Std. Error	obs. sig.
(constant)	0.498	0.459	0.279
Self reported Anger	0.327***	0.049	0.000
Self reported Fear	0.378***	0.058	0.000
Self reported Sadness	0.122**	0.054	0.026
Economic concern	0.098**	0.049	0.047
***significance at 1% level			
**significance at 5% level			

As Figures 8 and 9 show, the stepwise regression results show that self-reported anger and fear are most significantly associated with perceived risk of terror attacks and concerns for national security. This is consistent with the observation that propagating anger and fear heightens national security concerns in the public, hence pressuring (or allowing) policymakers to implement more stringent and divisive counter-terrorism policy (De Vreese and Kandyla, 2009). This is, to some extent, visible after the London Bridge Attacks with Theresa May's proposal for changes to human rights laws in attempt to combat terrorism (BBC News, 2017b). Previous research has also shown that citizens concerned about terrorism seem to be more likely to adopt hawkish foreign policy views from threatening news stories when those views are matched with emotionally powerful and fear-inducing cues (Kushner Gadarian, 2010).

However, in the absence of a suitable model that separates these causes and effects, the conclusions drawn are very much limited. Self-reported emotions, perception of terrorism risk and predetermined views of counterterrorism policy are inextricably and complexly related. Indeed, it is not certain where directly this anger is being directed at. It is possible for individuals to experience anger in multiple ways, for example, towards the terrorists themselves, the media's portrayal of the act of terrorism, the government. Though beyond the scope of this study, Fig. 10

suggests a possible way in which the observed positive correlation arises from a mutual association with predetermined views.

*Fig. 10. Mutual association with hawkish counterterrorism sentiments*



#### 4.2.2 Concern for personal safety

*Fig. 11. Regressors of significance from stepwise regression on concern for your safety*

Stepwise regression of 'concern of own safety'			
	coefficient	Std. Error	obs. sig.
(constant)	1.103	0.337	0.001
Self reported Fear	0.603***	0.055	0.000
Self reported Sadness	0.128**	0.051	0.013
Economic concern	0.097**	0.047	0.039
***significance at 1% level			
**significance at 5% level			

*Fig. 12. Regressors of significance from stepwise regression on concern for the safety of your family and friends*

Stepwise regression of 'concern of safety of family and friends'			
	coefficient	Std. Error	obs. sig.
(constant)	1.094	0.471	0.021
Self reported Fear	0.518***	0.062	0.000
Self reported Sadness	0.192***	0.061	0.002
Economic concern	0.162***	0.053	0.003
Self reported Shock	0.134**	0.061	0.028
***significance at 1% level			
**significance at 5% level			

Stepwise regression results show that self-reported fear and shock are most significantly associated with concerns for personal safety - that of yourself, family and friends. Sadness was also associated with such concerns. Such results indicate that those most concerned by personal (as opposed to national) security experience shock and sadness, rather than anger.

This distinction is relevant to understanding the potential role of sensationalist media. For example, it may indicate that news reports that exacerbate and legitimise public anger are most powerful in mobilising counterterrorism policy. While beyond the scope of the research here,, this association was substantiated by interviews. Indeed, one interviewee stated that his immediate response of anger almost made him want to retaliate and another expressed that the 'anger' framing had an inflammatory tone that triggered a need of revenge.

The aforementioned complexity of these factors limits conclusions and demands further research within a more suitable framework.

## 5. Concluding notes and areas for further research

To conclude, we showed that framings of ‘anger’ had a reverse priming effect and framings of ‘fear’ had an insignificant effect on the associated self-reports of the respective emotion. In demonstrating the potential for reverse priming effects and priming resistance, this result is an important contribution to the existing literature due to its contradiction with previous results. Analysing the effect of sensationalised media is particularly relevant in understanding the responses of more educated and younger internet users in the UK to media framings. This observation of heterogeneous priming effects motivates further research into the factors that influence media consumption across a broader sample. For example, one might consider how education levels, preconceptions and age determine the direction of priming effects.

Furthermore, situated in the contemporary context of social media and ‘fake news’, the relevance of these themes demonstrated the importance of an academic revision of ‘terroredia’ (Eid, 2014). Additionally, in this setting, further research may consider the latent priming effects of ‘neutral’ framings. As individuals indicated that emotionalised journalism is considered less credible, the perceived legitimacy of neutral reports may invoke stronger emotional responses.

It was also found that, while self-reported sadness and shock were more associated with concern for personal safety, anger was more related to national security concerns. This distinction suggests that discourses of anger are perhaps more powerful in mobilising counterterrorism policy. However, more rigorous examination of other factors, including the role of predetermined views, is necessary to draw further conclusions. Furthermore, with time-varying effects of framings on emotions and risk perceptions (Fischhoff *et al.*, 2012), the effects of the media outlined here cannot be considered long-term in relation to 2017 UK terror attacks.

Overall, this research sought to establish whether emotionalised media increase feelings of fear and anger, and whether this in turn leads to a higher perceived risk of terrorism. As shown

above, no clear conclusion can be made, and the complexity of the media, emotions, perceived risk and acts of terrorism hence needs to be recognised. Indeed, claims that media coverage and framings can lead to particular policy responses, such as supporting the War on Terror (Powell, 2011), should be rethought. It is important to understand both what framings are being used, anger or fear or in fact other emotions, and the subsequent emotional and risk perception reactions, rather than suggesting a linear movement from media framing (regardless of what frames are used) to specific policy. Indeed, it would be of further interest in exploring this relationship between policy and media framings in the reverse sense, as politicians and policymakers can seek to influence media framings to amplify their views and support particular policies (Pan and Kosicki, 1993).

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## 7. Appendix

### 7.1 Extracts used in experiment

The following extracts were taken from online articles and edited for our use.

#### **Neutral framing:**

'On 22 May 2017, a suicide bombing was carried out at Manchester Arena in Manchester, England, following a concert by American singer Ariana Grande. The attacker was identified as Salman Ramadan Abedi, a 22-year-old British Muslim who detonated a shrapnel-laden improvised explosive device at the exit of the arena after the event. Twenty-three adults and children, including Abedi, were killed and 116 were injured, some critically

Wikipedia. (2017). 2017 Manchester Arena bombing. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from Wikipedia: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017\\_Manchester\\_Arena\\_bombing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Manchester_Arena_bombing).'

#### **'Fear' framing:**

Manchester attack: 'Chaos, just absolute carnage'

'The attack, which took place in the foyer, caused hundreds of people to flee in terror, with young people at the concert separated from their parents in the chaos. It left a scene of carnage inside the concert venue.'

'...dozens of shocked relatives have been scouring hospitals and hotels in the hope of tracing their last movements. Some of the parents, who were waiting for their children, have also never been seen again.'

"many still don't know what has happened to their loved ones."

BBC. (2017, May 23). *Manchester attack: 'Chaos, just absolute carnage'*. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from BBC News:

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-40018272/manchester-attack-chaos-just-absolute-carnage>

Dodd, V., Pidd, H., Rawlinson, K., Siddique, H., & MacAskill, E. (2017, May 23). *At least 22 killed, 59 injured in suicide attack at Manchester Arena*. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from The Guardian:

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/22/manchester-arena-police-explosion-ariana-grande-concert-england>

BBC News. (2017, May 24). *The Papers*. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from BBC News: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-the-papers-40007204>

#### **'Anger' framing:**

'Why should we be calm, she argues, when our children are considered a legitimate target for mass murder?'

'Stop and think about how strange it is, how perverse it is, that more than 20 of our citizens have been butchered and we are basically saying: 'Everyone calm down. Love is the answer.' Where's the

rage? If the massacre of children and their parents on a fun night out doesn't make you feel rage, nothing will.'

"NO ONE should go to a gig and not return."

BBC News. (2017, May 24). *The Papers*. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from BBC News: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-the-papers-40007204>

O'Neill, B. (2017, May 23). *After Manchester: it's time for anger*. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from Spiked: <http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/after-manchester-its-time-for-anger/19849#.WTFkIxPyszZ>

Kandohla, T., Tonkin, S., Burke, D., & Campbell, S. (2017, May 24). *Mother who was critically injured in the Manchester terror attack has no idea her youngest daughter, 8, is dead as she lies unconscious in hospital*. Retrieved June 2, 2017, from MailOnline: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4533182/First-victim-Manchester-terror-attack-named.html>

### **7.2 Ethical Considerations and London Bridge Attack, June 3rd 2017**

Given the sensitivity of our research topic and the use of human subjects, great consideration was taken to minimise the distress caused. For this reason, our survey and interviews were prefaced with relevant trigger warnings and participants' informed consent was regularly sought.

In particular, following the London Bridge Attack, fieldwork was temporarily suspended in order to re-evaluate the necessary trigger warnings.

With respect to data protection compliance, all survey data was held securely with confidentiality and anonymity ensured.

Finally, in terms of the extracts used, use of names and personal accounts was avoided. Out of respect to those involved in these events, we were uncomfortable with utilising individuals' grief for the purpose of our experiment.

### **7.3 Sample Survey (below)**

## Introduction

Welcome.

We are student researchers at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Last week, we began collecting data for a project researching perceptions on terrorism. In light of the event of Saturday night, we understand that emotions might be raw, but we would very much appreciate a few minutes of your time to help us with our research into this very important subject. You may be shown extracts from articles publicly available in published media.

This survey will take you about 5 minutes.

By clicking the arrow at the bottom of this page, you are agreeing to participate anonymously and for the answers provided to be used in this research project. All data will be held securely, with confidentiality and anonymity ensured.

As this survey is on a possibly upsetting and distressing topic (terrorism), particularly at this time, if you feel the desire to stop participating, please close the webpage window. If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#).

If you have any questions about the survey or the research project, please contact [h.dupre@lse.ac.uk](mailto:h.dupre@lse.ac.uk) or visit [LSE Groups Website](#)

All responses will remain anonymous.  
Thank you for your participation.

## Demographic

What gender do you identify as?

- Male
- Female
- Other
- Prefer not to say

Which age group do you belong to?

- Under 18
- 18 - 24
- 25 - 34
- 35 - 44
- 45 - 54
- 55 - 64
- 65 - 74
- 75 - 84
- 85 or older

Choose the ethnicity that you identify as:

- White
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- East Asian
- South Asian
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- Other (Please specify)

Are you currently a student?

- Yes
- No

Have you lived in the UK in the past year?

- Yes
- No

If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#). Please be aware that by clicking this link, you are actively exiting the survey.

### Priming

Please read the following extracts on the Manchester terrorist attack before proceeding.

#### Manchester attack: 'Chaos, just absolute carnage'

'The attack, which took place in the foyer, caused hundreds of people to flee in terror, with young people at the concert separated from their parents in the chaos. It left a scene of carnage inside the concert venue.'

'...dozens of shocked relatives have been scouring hospitals and hotels in the hope of tracing their last movements. Some of the parents, who were waiting for their children, have also never been seen again.'

'Many still don't know what has happened to their loved ones.'

If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#). Please be aware that by clicking this link, you are actively exiting the survey.

### Fear and Anger

As you think about the recent terrorist attacks, how strongly do you feel:

Not at all

Extremely

Sadness	
Fear	
Anger	
Shock	

If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#). Please be aware that by clicking this link, you are actively exiting the survey.

## Risk Appraisal

How concerned are you that there will be another terrorist attack on the UK soil in the near future?

Not at all

Extremely

--	--

Regarding future terrorist attacks, how concerned are you about:

Not at all

Extremely

national security	
your safety	
the safety of your family and friends	

How concerned are you about the current economic situation of the UK?

Not at all

Extremely

--	--


If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#). Please be aware that by clicking this link, you are actively exiting the survey.

## Media


Do you or anyone in your close family work in the following news media industries:  
(forms of mass media that focus on delivering news to the general public or a target public)  
Please select all that apply.

- Print media (newspapers, newsmagazines)
- Internet media (online newspapers, news blogs, etc.)
- Broadcast news (radio and television)
- None at all

How many days in the past week did you read about national events in any form of published media?




How many days in the past week did you read about war and terrorism in any form of published media?



In general, do you have doubts about the truth of some of the terrorist threats reported in the news?



In general, what percentage of news articles on terrorism-related stories include false information?  
Give a percentage on a 0-100% scale.



We need to test to check that you are not a robot. Please select b as an answer in the question below, even if it does not represent your opinion.

What grade would you give the government on how well it deals with terrorism?

- A
- B
- C
- D

If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#). Please be aware that by clicking this link, you are actively exiting the survey.

## Open

What repercussions of terrorism concern you the most?

What are your thoughts on how the British government addresses terrorism?

What are your thoughts on how terrorism is portrayed in the media?

Please click on the arrow below to complete this survey.

If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#).  
Please be aware that by clicking this link, you are actively exiting the survey.

## Thanks

Thank you for your participation in our survey.  
If you are interested in the findings of this research,  
please visit [LSE Groups Website](#) after a couple of weeks have elapsed.

If you feel particularly affected by the content, there is UK government-issued support and suggestions [here](#).